Five years after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine: back to the future? by Rahr, Alexander
www.ssoar.info
Five years after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine:
back to the future?
Rahr, Alexander
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Rahr, A. (2009). Five years after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine: back to the future? (DGAPaktuell, 7). Berlin:
Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-128763
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Five Years after the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine
Ukraine is breathing easier these days, and the benefi-
ciary of  this positive development is indisputably the 
Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko. With the 
support of  the IMF she managed to keep social subsi-
dies for the population intact, while leading the Ukrai-
nian economy, still badly in need of  reform, out of  the 
recession. Timoshenko is projected to have excellent 
chances for a victory in the presidential elections, pro-
vided there is not another gas conflict with Russia.
Outlook
Timoshenko appeared in September 2009 along with 
two other candidates for the country’s highest office 
at the annual conference of  the Ukrainian foundation 
Yalta European Strategy (YES) in the Crimea, which 
she utilized primarily to showcase her successful crisis 
management to the numerous Western experts gath-
ered. Tellingly, the IMF competed with Russian and 
Chinese state funds to provide Ukraine economic sup-
port during the financial crisis. All three sides sought 
the political influence on the Ukraine that the billions 
in credit bring. Ukraine turned down Russia’s credit 
offer so as to avoid political dependence on Moscow, 
but hopes to receive additional assistance from China. 
Moscow has thus missed the chance to use the severe 
economic crisis of  its neighbor to its advantage and 
so come closer to its declared goal of  purchasing the 
Ukrainian pipeline network.
Timoshenko, however, did manage to defuse the gas 
conflict with Russia—a development of  vital impor-
tance for Ukraine’s stability. While President Viktor 
Yushchenko quarreled yet again with Russia and even 
supported Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili in 
his country’s conflict with Moscow, Timoshenko used 
her successful negotiations with Russian Prime Minis-
ter Vladimir Putin to suggest to the Ukrainian public 
that she is capable of  reconciling the two Slavic na-
tions. Timoshenko’s approach was well received, both 
by the pro-Russian population in eastern Ukraine and 
the Russian leadership. She was able to negotiate with 
Putin a new delivery and transit agreement for the ex-
port of  Russian gas to Ukraine and Europe, so that no 
new complications are expected this winter. Ukraine 
has refilled its reservoirs with Russian gas, financed in 
part with Western credit. The EU thus has no reason 
in the coming winter to fear a potential supply disrup-
tion of  “political nature” between Russia and Ukraine.
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Yushchenko, the current incumbent and hero of  the 
2004 Orange Revolution, is trailing badly in the polls: 
Only three percent of  Ukrainians would give him their 
vote. The population has turned away from him in 
disappointment. Yushchenko’s radically pro-Western 
foreign policy also appears to have failed: The presi-
dent had attempted—at a time when he still felt the 
support of  the former American administration—to 
establish with Georgia and the Baltic states a “front 
for the defense of  freedom” against the allegedly neo-
imperialist Russia, with the hope of  a quick accession 
to NATO and the EU. After Barack Obama shelved 
plans for stationing a missile-defense system in Central 
Europe and after the publication of  an EU report that 
gave Georgia the blame for the 2008 war in the Cauca-
sus, Yushchenko must tone down his confrontational 
rhetoric against Moscow or risk total political isolation. 
Against the background of  the current Russian-Ameri-
can rapprochement, the prospects for NATO mem-
bership for both Ukraine and Georgia have receded far 
into the distance.
The Ukrainian presidential candidates Timoshenko, 
Viktor Yanukovych, and Arseniy Yatsenyuk spoke 
accordingly about a possible NATO membership for 
their country at the YES conference. Timoshenko 
pointed to the Ukrainian public’s widespread skepti-
cism over NATO accession and stated, she would 
rather cooperate with the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP). Timoshenko declared that the 
Ukraine should not have to choose to become either 
pro-European or pro-Russian: The country does not 
want to choose between its “mother and father.” Yanu-
kovych conceptualized his country as a regional power 
between Europe and Asia, and characterized the 
“Euro-romanticism” in Ukraine as a thing of  the past. 
He claimed that as president he would seek to keep 
Ukraine out of  any security alliance blocks. Yatsenyuk 
criticized Brussels for creating a new divide between 
the EU and Eastern Europe. With an eye to reconcili-
ation with Russia, he appealed at the conference to the 
old idea of  “greater Europe.”
The candidates have three months to make their case 
before the presidential elections, with polling showing 
the former Prime Minister Yanukovych leading Ti-
moshenko. It is widely expected that the two will have 
to carry the fight to a second round of  voting. Ex-
perts believe that the candidate who can attract in the 
second round the supporters of  the likely third-place 
candidate, Yatsenyuk, will ultimately become president. 
In contrast to the 2004 election, in which the West and 
Russia supported the Orange Revolution and Yanu-
kovych, respectively, the foreign influence on the cur-
rent Ukrainian election is minimal. Neither Russia nor 
the West has a clear favorite. Nevertheless, a continua-
tion of  the competition between the West and Russia 
for influence in Ukraine may have its effects.
Potential for Conflict between Kiev  
and Moscow
Russian-Ukrainian relations have been difficult since 
the Orange Revolution, characterized by confronta-
tional rhetoric. Russia resented Yushchenko’s NATO 
ambitions and his attempts to rewrite Ukrainian his-
tory to present the country as the perennial victim of  
Russian colonialism. Russian official media reports on 
Ukraine are biased and spiteful, with the consequence 
that public opinion polls show 50 percent of  Russians 
having a negative perception of  Ukraine. Only 6 per-
cent of  Ukrainians have a similar opinion about Russia. 
Ukrainians have a much more positive view of  Russia 
than vice versa and seem to have forgiven Russia the 
gas conflict in the winter of  2009.
There are still a number of  sticking points between 
Kiev and Moscow. One is the stationing of  the Rus-
sian Black Sea fleet in the port city of  Sevastopol in 
the Crimea. The lease agreement runs out in 2017, 
and Yushchenko is adamantly opposed to its renewal, 
as the presence of  the Russian fleet is an obstacle to 
Ukraine’s NATO accession. Russia has no ready alter-
native to Sevastopol for the fleet, and has indicated 
it would like to extend its naval presence there. The 
leaders of  both countries have seven years to decide 
on an extension of  the Russian fleet’s stationing in 
Ukrainian territory. Moscow naturally hopes that by 
this time a more pro-Russian government will be in 
DGAPaktuell 2009/7 
Five Years after the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine
power in Ukraine, one that would be more receptive to 
a lucrative offer. If  the Ukrainians vote against NATO 
accession in the referendum planned for the near fu-
ture, the problem of  the Black Sea fleet would possibly 
be defused.
A fundamental problem in the relationship between 
the two countries is that currently they both have dif-
ferent geopolitical orientations. Russia would like to 
reintegrate with Ukraine by creating a common market 
or customs union (to which Belarus and Kazakhstan 
would also belong). Ukraine, on the other hand, is 
striving for integration into the West. So long as Kiev 
and Moscow do not belong to different security al-
liances, this difference in geopolitical strategy is of  
limited importance. It would be a disaster, however, 
for Ukraine to become a part of  NATO’s “front line” 
against an anti-Western Russia. European history is 
replete with examples of  conflicts caused by empires 
collapsing. In the “big brother/little brother phenom-
enon”, the resulting larger country acts imperialistically 
towards the smaller, which casts itself  in the role of  
the victim. In all of  the familiar cases, however—Great 
Britain-Ireland, France-Belgium, Sweden-Finland, 
Turkey-Greece—the two countries have never been in 
different security alliances. The latent Russian-Ukrai-
nian conflict over this security issue could thus be 
lessened or even done away with by the dialogue on 
a new common Euro-Atlantic security architecture 
suggested by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. The 
OSCE could conceivably be upgraded into a common 
security organization.
Russia remains one of  the major investors in Ukraine, 
even with the financial crisis dramatically reducing the 
trade between both countries. Russia owns 223 facto-
ries on Ukrainian soil, 150 of  which are located in the 
Crimea. The Ukrainian economy is in foreign trade 
more dependent on the Russian market than vice versa. 
Potential trade barriers, for example a withdrawal of  
Ukraine from the Commonwealth of  Independent 
States (CIS), would be very damaging for Ukraine’s 
economy if  Kiev did not diversify its economic ties to 
the West.
The Need for Reform
It is still premature to assess Ukraine’s navigation out 
of  the financial crisis. No one knows if  the country 
can survive in the coming months without Western 
aid. Timoshenko promised Western investors fair 
participation in a transparent privatization process, 
including that of  the Ukrainian gas transportation 
network, which Ukraine hitherto considered its most 
important symbol for its independence from Russia. 
In preliminary EU negotiations without Russia’s par-
ticipation, Kiev and Brussels have agreed to create a 
bilateral consortium to modernize the pipelines. At the 
same time, however, the EU is a staunch supporter of  
the so-called Nabucco pipeline, projected to be built 
mid-decade, which would transport natural gas from 
Central Asia and Iraq through Turkey (and hence not 
through the Ukraine), bypassing the Russian pipeline 
monopoly to the West.
Once the elections are over, the EU should further 
engage Ukraine without increasing the divisions be-
tween Russia and Kiev. Russia should be more actively 
integrated into the EU’s eastern partnership—a step 
the Swedish and Czech EU presidencies opposed. The 
upcoming Spanish presidency will again open up to 
Russia, and interesting collaborative projects are sure 
to be found in which all sides can engage—and not 
just in the energy sector.
A UN study estimates the total population of  Ukraine 
could shrink from the current 48 million to just 36 
million by 2050. The life expectancy in the Ukraine has 
decreased 10 years since Ukraine achieved indepen-
dence. Any government in Kiev will have to deal with 
the issues of  legal and social reforms, demographic 
change, and, most importantly, energy efficiency. One 
lesson must be learned from the financial crisis: The 
modernization of  the economy must be carried out 
as quickly as possible and at any cost. Ukraine should 
have long since completed radical reforms, when after 
the 2004 Orange Revolution the country was riding 
high on Western goodwill and generous aid and invest-
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ment. Yushchenko’s failure to utilize the last half-de-
cade is inexplicable.
6th Yalta European Strategy Conference: Ukraine and the 
World after the Crisis
Yalta, September 24–27, 2009
Organizer: Yalta European Strategy (YES) Alexander Rahr  
<rahr@dgap.org>
